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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Every year, thousands of American teenagers are arrested and tried as adults.
In 2011, state prisons across the country housed almost two thousand juvenile
2
3
offenders. Many of these young offenders serve for only a few years. But Victor
4
Mendez was not so lucky. In 2007, when he was sixteen, Mendez and other
members of the Los Angeles Blythe Street Gang carjacked a green Chevrolet
5
Lumina and took it for a spin. Mendez parked the car, threatened some
6
bystanders with a gun, and took their wallets. A jury ultimately convicted
Mendez of carjacking, assault with a firearm, and “seven counts of second degree
7
robbery.” The trial court sentenced Mendez to state prison—for eighty-four
8
years.
9
Mendez’s lengthy prison sentence raised Eighth Amendment concerns.
Notably, the Supreme Court of the United States had recently ruled in Graham v.
Florida that a state could not sentence juvenile offenders who committed
nonhomicide crimes to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
10
(LWOP). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, also explained that a state
must give defendants “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
11
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
While Mendez had not received an actual LWOP sentence, he argued that
because his decades-long sentence exceeded his natural lifespan, it was a de facto
LWOP sentence, one that was functionally equivalent to the kind of sentences
12
condemned by the Supreme Court. A California appellate court agreed and held
that Mendez’s de facto LWOP sentence was cruel and unusual punishment

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2013; B.A., Economics, Saint Mary’s College
of California, 2010. I thank Professor Emily Garcia Uhrig for her advice and direction on this Comment. I also
thank my family and friends for their daily inspiration and the editors of the McGeorge Law Review for their
tireless work.
1. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2011 33 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id.
3. From 1985 to 1997, the average juvenile offender served a minimum of five years, and the average
maximum sentence for violent crime was eight years. KEVIN J. STROM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF STATE PRISONERS UNDER AGE 18, 1985–97, at 1 (2000).
4. See California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 873 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (discussing Mendez’s
lengthy sentence).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 874.
7. Id. at 873.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882.
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because he did not have a meaningful opportunity to seek release during his
13
lifetime.
Mendez and a few other juvenile offenders successfully challenged their de
14
facto LWOP sentences by invoking Graham’s general principles. But most
juvenile offenders who have sought relief from their lengthy sentences under
15
Graham have failed. Indeed, as this Comment goes to press, only a handful of
courts, including the California Supreme Court in 2012, have held that de facto
LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses are cruel and
16
unusual.
This Comment argues that de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles who
commit nonhomicide offenses categorically violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. For purposes of this Comment, I define a “de
facto LWOP sentence” as a term-of-years sentence that serves as the “functional
17
equivalent of a life without parole term,” in effect, a sentence that offers the
possibility of parole in name only. Part II provides a brief overview of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and how lower courts have
responded to Graham. Part III explains why de facto LWOP sentences for
juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes fail the Supreme Court’s traditional
Eighth Amendment tests and argues for a categorical ban against these sentences.
13. Id. at 886.
14. See, e.g., California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (invalidating a 175year-long sentence for a juvenile who committed aggravated kidnapping); California v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d
141 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a juvenile’s de facto LWOP sentence for various sex
offenses).
15. See Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal
Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 425 n.91 (2011) (discussing cases in which juvenile
offenders have attempted to use Graham to challenge their sentences but have largely failed).
16. Generally, state supreme courts that have confronted Graham have mostly dealt with actual LWOP,
not de facto LWOP sentences. See, e.g., Angel v. Virginia, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (holding that
Graham did not apply to a juvenile defendant who was sentenced to three life sentences for various sex
offenses); Missouri v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding that a fifteen-year-old who
committed first-degree murder cannot invoke Graham); Wisconsin v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 474, 478 (Wis.
2011) (holding that an actual LWOP sentence for a fourteen-year-old who committed first-degree murder was
not cruel and unusual punishment); Bonilla v. Iowa, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (holding that a
mandatory LWOP sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender was unconstitutional). The state supreme
courts that have faced a de facto LWOP sentence for a minor have not reached the merits of its constitutionality.
See, e.g., Adams v. Georgia, 707 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2011) (upholding a juvenile’s twenty-five year to life
sentence and declining to apply Graham without commentary); Rogers v. Nevada, 267 P.3d 802 (Nev. 2011)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to appoint counsel for a juvenile offender
in the post-conviction phase, but leaving the issue of de facto LWOP sentences unresolved). As of publication,
only one federal circuit had addressed, and rejected, a challenge to a de facto LWOP sentence based on
Graham’s general principles. Bunch v. Smith 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012). But see California v. Caballero, 282
P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (holding that de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violate
the Eighth Amendment).
17. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 297. De facto LWOP sentences, by their nature, do not provide the offender a
meaningful opportunity for release. See Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 (“[C]ommon sense dictates that a
juvenile who is sentenced at the age of eighteen and who is not eligible for parole until after he is expected to
die does not have a meaningful . . . opportunity for release.”).

963

_05_FREEMAN_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:41 AM

2013 / The Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences
Part IV discusses the practical implications of this Comment and whether
juvenile offenders will see any meaningful change if courts adopt a categorical
ban. Part V concludes that courts should embrace the spirit of Graham’s holding
and provide a meaningful opportunity for individuals like Victor Mendez to
18
experience life outside of prison before they die.
II. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA AND ITS APPLICATION
19

This Part analyzes Graham v. Florida and its reception in the lower courts.
Section A provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s tests for cruel and
unusual punishment. Section B discusses Graham itself and its new categorical
rule. Section C discusses the application of Graham in lower courts and uses
California as an example. Section D examines the Supreme Court’s post-Graham
jurisprudence, including the California Supreme Court’s rejection of de facto
LWOP sentences.
A. When Is a Punishment “Cruel and Unusual”? An Overview of the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment provides, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
20
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The
Supreme Court has examined the Eighth Amendment in light of “the evolving
21
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Thus, as
American society evolves, so too does the Court’s definition of what is cruel and
22
unusual. Traditionally, the Supreme Court analyzed Eighth Amendment
challenges under two separate analytical frameworks, depending on the type of
case: (1) in non-death penalty cases, whether a defendant’s individual sentence is
grossly disproportionate to his or her crime and (2) in death penalty cases,
23
whether any special categorical rules apply.
Under the first framework, defendants on a case-by-case basis argue that
24
their sentences are excessive in relation to their crimes. To determine whether
the length of a sentence is unconstitutional, the Court must apply a three-step
25
test. First, the Court compares the “gravity of the offense and the severity of the

18. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
19. See infra Part II.B–C (discussing Graham itself and its aftermath).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
21. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
22. See id. (elaborating on this point).
23. Michi Momose, A Case for Hope: Examining Graham v. Florida and Its Implications for Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 391, 394–96 (2010).
24. Id. at 394–95.
25. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).

964

_05_FREEMAN_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:41 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
26

sentence.” Next, if the Court draws an “inference of gross disproportionality,” it
compares the defendant’s sentence with those sentences “received by other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same
27
crime in other jurisdictions.” Finally, if this comparison “validate[s] an initial
judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence violates
28
the Eighth Amendment.
The second analytical framework involves several categorical rules involving
29
the death penalty. These rules typically prevent a state from imposing the death
30
penalty in certain cases. The Court has divided these categorical rules into two
types: cases involving the “nature of the offense” and cases involving the
31
“characteristics of the offender.” In nature-of-the-offense cases, the Court held
32
that courts cannot sentence defendants to death for nonhomicide crimes. In
characteristics-of-the-offender cases, the Court held that the death penalty is
33
inappropriate for juvenile offenders or people “whose intellectual functioning is
34
in a low range.”
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court announced a categorical rule
35
prohibiting courts from sentencing juvenile offenders to death. The Court’s
36
decision included an extensive discussion about juvenile culpability. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that juveniles differ from adult
offenders in three ways: juveniles are less mature, “are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences . . . including peer pressure,” and lack a fully
37
developed character. Justice Kennedy went on to suggest that “[f]rom a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of
an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will
38
be reformed.” Justice Kennedy’s argument about the “diminished culpability of
39
juveniles” would later resurface in Graham v. Florida.

26. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)).
27. Id.
28. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Momose, supra note 23, at 396–400.
30. See infra, text accompanying notes 35–38 (discussing specific types of categorical rules).
31. Id. at 2022.
32. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)).
33. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (holding that the death penalty cannot be imposed on
defendants under eighteen years of age); see also infra text accompanying notes 35–38 (discussing Roper in
detail).
34. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
36. Id. at 569–70.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 570.
39. Id. at 571; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (discussing how juvenile culpability is a factor in
creating a categorical ban against actual LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenders).
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40

When the Court adopts a categorical rule, it undertakes a two-step analysis.
First, the Court considers whether there is a “national consensus against the
41
sentencing practice.” Second, if such a consensus exists, the Court “must
determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the
42
punishment in question violates the Constitution.” When exercising its
independent judgment, the Court considers factors such as the culpability of the
43
offender and whether the sentence furthers legitimate penological goals.
B. Graham’s Categorical Rule
The Court adhered to its established analytical frameworks for determining
whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment until it decided
44
Graham v. Florida in 2010. For the first time, the Court adopted a categorical
45
rule outside of the death penalty context. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, held that actual LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit
46
nonhomicide offenses violated the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the Court
noted that a state should “give defendants like Graham some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
47
rehabilitation.”
The defendant, Terrance Jamar Graham, was sixteen years old when he
48
committed attempted burglary. Six months after he pleaded guilty, police again
49
arrested Graham for robbery. The sentencing judge believed Graham was
50
irredeemable because he had quickly returned to a life of crime. The judge
51
ordered Graham to serve a life sentence.
The Supreme Court applied its two-step categorical rule test to Graham’s
52
actual LWOP sentence. The Court found that a national consensus against
40. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
41. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 541 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2028.
44. Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.
45. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new categorical rule “eviscerates”
the distinction between death and other sentences). In contrast, some have argued that the Graham Court did not
destroy this distinction, but merely created a heightened standard of review for LWOP sentences under the
Eighth Amendment. See generally William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than Death,
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010) (articulating this point).
46. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2018.
49. Id.
50. Id. The trial judge believed that Graham was a danger to the community. Id. Notably, the trial judge
gave the maximum sentence, while the prosecution had argued for just a thirty year sentence. Id. at 2019–20.
51. Id. at 2020. This sentence was effectively an actual LWOP sentence because Florida had abolished
its parole system. Id.
52. Id. at 2022–23. “This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of
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sentencing juveniles to LWOP for nonhomicide crimes existed. Justice Kennedy
explained that although thirty-seven states allowed juveniles to serve LWOP
sentences for nonhomicide offenses, “nationwide there are only 109 juvenile
54
offenders serving [LWOP] for nonhomicide offenses.” The Court then exercised
55
its independent judgment in creating a categorical rule. In so doing, the Court
looked at two factors: the lessened culpability of juvenile offenders in general
and the fact that LWOP sentences in this context did not further legitimate
56
penological goals.
Justice Kennedy explained that a categorical rule—as opposed to a case-by57
case approach—was necessary for several reasons. First, existing state law
58
protections did not prevent judges from imposing these sentences on juveniles.
Second, Justice Kennedy doubted that “courts taking a case-by-case
proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few
incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for
59
change.” Third, the case-by-case approach may prevent a juvenile from
receiving a proper defense because “[j]uveniles mistrust adults and have limited
60
understandings of the criminal justice system . . . .” As a result, they “are less
61
likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers . . . .” Finally, Justice
Kennedy argued that a categorical rule would give juvenile offenders a chance to
start over:
[A] categorical rule gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to
demonstrate maturity and reform. . . . [LWOP sentences give] no chance
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with
society, no hope. . . . A young person who knows that he or she has no
chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a
responsible individual. . . . A categorical rule against [LWOP] for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids the perverse consequence in
which the lack of maturity that led to an offender’s crime is reinforced by
62
the prison term.

offenders who have committed a range of crimes. As a result, a threshold comparison between the severity of
the penalty and the gravity of the crime does not advance the analysis. Here . . . the appropriate analysis is the
one used in cases that involved the categorical approach . . . .” Id.
53. Id. at 2023.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2026.
56. Id. at 2026–30.
57. Id. at 2030–33.
58. Id. at 2031.
59. Id. at 2032.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
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Several Justices disagreed with the majority. Chief Justice Roberts
64
concurred in the judgment but argued that a categorical rule was unnecessary.
65
66
Justices Alito and Thomas wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Alito
rejected the majority holding and argued it did not apply to lengthy term-of-years
67
sentences. Justice Thomas did not believe a national consensus existed—“[t]hat
a punishment is rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more than a general
68
consensus that it should be just that—rarely imposed.”
C. The Golden State Is Split: Graham Divides California’s Appellate Districts
The Court’s holding in Graham is quite narrow—it only applies to actual
69
LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. Nonetheless,
in subsequent lower-court cases, juvenile offenders have argued that Justice
Kennedy’s language about a meaningful opportunity for release should apply to
70
de facto LWOP sentences as well. The offenders’ argument is simple. First, the
Supreme Court in Graham banned actual LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders
71
who did not commit homicide. Second, de facto LWOP sentences are the
functional equivalent of actual LWOP sentences because neither provides
72
juveniles with a meaningful opportunity for release during their lifetime. Thus,
if a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide crime receives a term-of-years
sentence that exceeds his or her natural lifespan, that sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment. Unfortunately, most lower courts that have confronted this question
73
have refused to apply Graham outside of its narrow holding.
However, some California appellate courts extended Graham to include de
74
facto LWOP sentences. The leading case is California v. Mendez, in which the
California Second District Court of Appeal held unconstitutional a juvenile’s
75
sentence of eighty-four years to life for carjacking Mendez argued that, under
63. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas).
64. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
65. Id. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2051–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2051 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2030 (majority opinion).
70. See Hechinger, supra note 15, at 435 n.91 (describing cases in which juvenile defendants used
Graham to challenge their de facto LWOP sentences).
71. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (stating the holding).
72. See California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882–83 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (articulating this
point).
73. See, e.g., Hechinger, supra note 15, at 425 n.91 (describing the lower court decisions that have
declined to extend Graham beyond its holding).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 78–86 (discussing these cases).
75. 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 883; see also supra Part I (discussing the case). Mendez challenged his sentence
under the federal and state constitutions, though the court only discussed the former. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d
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his sentence, he would not be eligible for parole until he was eighty-eight years
old, while the national life expectancy for a typical American male is seventy-six
76
years. A panel of California’s Second District Court of Appeal agreed that
77
Mendez’s sentence was “materially indistinguishable” from an LWOP sentence.
Notably, the panel did not expressly apply Graham, but did adhere to the case’s
general principle that states must provide juveniles a meaningful opportunity for
78
release. The panel noted that “a state is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime, [but Graham
does require] that a state ‘must’ give a juvenile” a meaningful opportunity for
79
release. Subsequently, some California appellate panels have followed
80
Mendez’s reasoning. Notably, the California Third District Court of Appeal
explained why juvenile nonhomicide offenders who commit multiple crimes or
injure multiple victims can still challenge a de facto LWOP sentence:
A distinction premised on the multiple offenses or victims that often
underlie a de facto LWOP [sentence] is also unpersuasive. The
distinction finds no traction in Graham, given the juvenile there was a
recidivist offender sentenced on multiple felonies, including separate
instances of armed commercial burglary and home invasion robbery. . . .
Nevertheless the de facto LWOP [sentence] imposed there did not
survive constitutional scrutiny, based on the lesser culpability of
juveniles measured against the severity of a sentence denying any
possibility of release. . . . While the sum of [the defendant’s] conduct is
more serious because he committed multiple offenses, and he is
accordingly more culpable than a defendant who commits only a single
81
offense, under Graham his culpability remains diminished as a juvenile.
In short, the court explained that Graham’s rationale applies to all juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, regardless of how many victims or offenses are

at 882–83.
76. Id. at 882. The life expectancy for a typical American female is 81.1 years. DONNA L. HOYERT &
JIAQUAN XU, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVISION OF VITAL STATISTICS, DEATHS:
PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2011, 2 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
77. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000)).
78. Id. at 882–83.
79. Id. at 883 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)) (emphasis added, internal
quotations omitted).
80. See, e.g., California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 627 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (holding that a
sentence of 175 years to life for a fourteen- year- old defendant was cruel and unusual punishment); California
v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141, 149 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (holding that a fifty-years-to-life sentence for a
fourteen-year-old defendant was cruel and unusual punishment because the defendant was ineligible for parole
until age seventy). In J.I.A., the court also relied on California’s equivalent to the Eighth Amendment to strike
down the de facto LWOP sentence. 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 150–53.
81. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 624.
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involved. Each juvenile offender, due to the virtue of his or her age, must
receive a meaningful opportunity for release, even if the state ultimately does not
83
set that offender free.
A few months after the Mendez decision, a different panel of the Second
District Court of Appeal upheld a 110-year sentence for a sixteen year old who
84
committed attempted murder. In that case, California v. Caballero, the court
85
expressly refused to apply Graham’s general principles. The court instead noted
that there are only two ways a juvenile defendant in California can receive a
sentence that exceeds his or her lifespan: (1) “commit crimes against multiple
victims during separate incidents,” or (2) “commit certain enumerated offenses,
86
discharge a gun, and inflict great bodily injury upon at least two victims.” The
court reasoned that, although the combined sentences exceeded the defendant’s
life expectancy, the overall sentence was constitutional because each individual
87
sentence was commensurate to the defendant’s crimes. Subsequently, other
panels of the California Second District Court of Appeal followed Caballero’s
88
reasoning. In 2012, the California Supreme Court rejected the Caballero line of
89
cases.
D. Post-Graham Developments: The High Court Clarifies Graham in Miller v.
Alabama and the California Supreme Court Rejects de Facto LWOP
Sentences
Shortly after deciding Graham, the Court, in Miller v. Alabama, took up the
question of whether the case’s categorical ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile
90
nonhomicide offenders applied to juvenile homicide offenders as well. While
the Court did not categorically ban all such sentences, it held that mandatory
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth

82. Id.
83. Id. at 624–25.
84. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 927 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011).
85. Id. at 926.
86. Id.
87. Id. “Following Mendez’s reasoning, an individual who shot and severely injured any number of
victims during separate attempts on their lives could not receive a term commensurate with his or her crimes if
all the victims had the good fortune to survive their wounds, because the sentence would exceed the
perpetrator’s life expectancy. Graham does not purport to compel such a result.” Id. But see Nuñez, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 624 (arguing that the number of crimes or victims involved is irrelevant because the defendant is a
juvenile).
88. See, e.g., California v. Ramirez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (holding that a
sentence of 120 years to life for a juvenile defendant who committed attempted murder was constitutional). But
see id. at 166–71 (Manella, J., dissenting) (arguing that Graham applies and that the defendant’s sentence is
unconstitutional).
89. California v. Cabellero, 282 P.3d 291, 293, 295 (Cal. 2012).
90. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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Amendment. The Court reasoned that “none of what [the Graham court] said
about children . . . is crime specific. . . . Graham’s reasoning implicates any lifewithout-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates
92
only to nonhomicide offenses.”
Just a few months after Miller, the California Supreme Court addressed the
93
appellate split on de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
In a brief, unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court in California v.
Caballero reversed the lower court and held that “sentencing a juvenile offender
for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that
falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and
94
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” The court
explained that Miller “made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on life without
parole sentences for juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases applies to their
sentencing equation regardless of . . . how a sentencing court structures the life
95
without parole sentence.” Because Graham applies to any LWOP sentencing
regime for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the California Supreme Court
explained it also applies to a “term-of-years sentence that amounts to the
96
functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence imposed in this case.” At
the end of its opinion, the Court reiterated that new sentences must “not violate
the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights and must provide him or her a
‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
97
rehabilitation’ under Graham’s mandate.”
III. APPLYING THE TESTS FOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
TO DE FACTO LWOP SENTENCES
This Part explains why de facto LWOP sentences will fare poorly under the
Supreme Court of the United States’ tests for cruel and unusual punishment.
Section A briefly discusses the grossly disproportionate test. Section B discusses
how de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes
satisfy the two elements of the categorical rule test; first, it explains why a
national consensus against these sentences exists and second, why in a court’s

91. Id. at 2475.
92. Id. at 2465 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the Court’s opinion
might invite a future Court to take dramatic measures: “Unless confined, the only stopping point for the Court’s
analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults.” Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
93. Cabellero, 282 P.3d at 293; see also supra Part II.C (detailing the facts of this case and the lower
court’s opinion).
94. Cabellero, 282 P.3d at 295.
95. Id. at 294.
96. Id. at 295.
97. Id. at 295–96.
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independent judgment, the practice violates the Constitution. That section also
discusses opposing arguments. Section C explains how Graham’s general
principle—that states must offer juvenile defendants a meaningful opportunity
for release—applies to de facto LWOP sentences.
A. The Grossly Disproportionate Test
Juvenile offenders can challenge their sentences as grossly disproportionate
98
to the offense committed. In this situation, a juvenile offender must first argue
that the severity of a de facto LWOP sentence is grossly disproportionate to the
99
gravity of the offense. A court “can consider a particular offender’s mental
100
state” when evaluating this argument. Juvenile offenders could argue that,
because a person’s “culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
101
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity,” and because a de facto LWOP
sentence is so severe that it denies the offender all hope and renders “good
102
behavior and character improvement . . . immaterial,”
the sentence is
unconstitutional.
Assuming a court agrees, the defendant must next argue that a de facto
LWOP sentence is more severe than those imposed on other offenders “in the
same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
103
jurisdictions.” In general, juveniles who receive de facto LWOP sentences
104
constitute a small minority of the juveniles who serve lengthy sentences. This
Comment estimates that only seventy-one juvenile offenders nationwide are
105
serving de facto LWOP sentences. In contrast, the historical average prison
sentence for a juvenile offender who committed a violent crime was only eight
106
and one-half years. These numbers are instructive because they reveal how rare
a de facto LWOP sentence is. Thus, a juvenile offender who receives a de facto
LWOP sentence must serve a punishment that is harsher than what most of his or
98. Momose, supra note 23, at 395–96.
99. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
1005 (1991)) (discussing the first element of the test).
100. Id. at 2037 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983)).
101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
102. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Naovarath v. Nevada, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. See id. at 2022 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)) (discussing the second
element of the test).
104. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the national consensus against de facto LWOP sentences and the
assumptions behind this estimate).
105. Id. The Sentencing Project, a group that gathers information from state correctional departments
about prisoner demographics, provides some additional information on this point. Interactive Map,
SENTENCING PROJECT, http://sentencing project.org/map/map.cfm#map (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
106. See STROM, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that average maximum sentence of a violent juvenile
offender in 1985 was 109 months and in 1997 was 98 months).
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her peers receive. Although successful challenges are “exceedingly rare” under
108
this proportionality argument, juvenile offenders are more likely to raise
109
inferences of gross disproportionality due to their age. Because juveniles
serving de facto LWOP sentences can satisfy the elements of the test, courts may
110
strike down their sentences. However, because the test is fact-specific, not all
111
defendants will successfully challenge their de facto LWOP sentence.
B. Building a Categorical Rule
Because a case-by-case approach will not fully protect juveniles from de
facto LWOP sentences, courts should impose a categorical ban on this sentencing
practice. In order to impose a categorical ban, a court must find that (1) a national
consensus against imposing LWOP sentences exists, and (2) in the court’s
112
independent judgment, the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. When
deciding the second element, a court can rely on factors such as the culpability of
113
114
the defendant and whether the sentence furthers legitimate penological goals.
1. A National Consensus Exists Against Imposing de Facto LWOP
Sentences on Juveniles Who Commit Nonhomicide Offenses
To determine whether a national consensus exists, a court looks to enacted
115
legislation and “[a]ctual sentencing practices.” Thus, a court can see how many
states allow the sentencing practice or, alternatively, how often states actually
116
impose that sentence. In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that thirty-seven
states—a supermajority—permitted LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit
nonhomicide offenses, but found that “an examination of actual sentencing
practices in jurisdictions where the sentence in question is permitted . . . discloses
117
a consensus against its use.” Indeed, Justice Kennedy wrote that “sentences of
life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders . . . are most

107. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the rarity of de facto LWOP sentences).
108. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
109. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2039 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court could invalidate Graham’s sentence under the grossly disproportionate test and that “[t]here is no reason
why an offender’s juvenile status should be excluded from the [proportionality] analysis.”).
110. Id. at 2022, 2039.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 541 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
113. Id. (citing Roper, 541 U.S. at 568) (stating that the Court can consider whether the defendant was
under the age of eighteen or mentally handicapped).
114. Id. at 2028.
115. Id. at 2023.
116. Id. at 2023–24.
117. Id. at 2023.
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infrequent.” The Court explained that a national consensus existed because
there were “only 109 juvenile offenders serving [LWOP sentences] for
119
nonhomicide offenses.” Thus, even if a supermajority of states allow a
sentencing practice, the Court will find a national consensus against that practice
120
if the states rarely use it.
Currently, there is no data regarding how many juvenile offenders serve de
facto LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses. However, there is data
regarding how many juveniles serve life sentences in general, and the types of
121
crimes these juvenile offenders committed. The rest of this section uses a
conservative hypothetical to illustrate why a national consensus exists. This
hypothetical takes the following steps: (1) it lists the number of juvenile
offenders currently in state prisons, (2) it calculates the number of juvenile
offenders who were convicted of murder and other crimes not relevant to this
analysis and then excludes them, and (3) it estimates the number of remaining
juveniles serving de facto LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses.
122
In 2011, state prisons nationwide housed 1,790 juvenile offenders. Of those
offenders, the prisons admitted approximately 125 (seven percent) for murder
convictions and a combined 251 (fourteen percent) for drug offenses (nine
123
percent) and public order offenses (five percent). Those 376 individuals are
124
excluded from this analysis.

118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. Justice Thomas argued that no national consensus existed because a supermajority of states
allowed the practice. Id. at 2049 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s reliance on
the infrequent usage of the sentence was “nothing short of stunning.” Id. “[T]he Court has never banished into
constitutional exile a sentencing practice that the laws of a majority, let alone a supermajority, of States
expressly permit.” Id. Justice Thomas later added that “[b]ased on its rarity of use, the Court proclaims a
consensus against the practice . . . [but just because] a sentence is rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more
than a general consensus that it should be just that—rarely imposed.” Id. at 2051.
120. See id. at 2023 (discussing how the Court determined a national consensus).
121. See CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 20 (listing the number of juvenile offenders that state
prisons housed in 2011); HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 238 (2006) (listing the
types of crimes that the incoming juvenile offenders committed); see also ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 17–18 (2009),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_NoExitSept2009.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing additional data regarding juvenile life sentences in general).
122. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 33. This analysis uses the most recent juvenile admittance data
available, but estimates the number of juveniles who committed homicide and other crimes based on
percentages from 2002. While this latter data set is older, it is safe to assume that the percentage of juveniles
admitted for various crimes has remained relatively stable. Compare JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS 7 (2000) (listing the
number of juveniles who committed homicide offenses in 1997 as seven percent of all juvenile offenders
admitted to state prison), with SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 121, at 238 (using 2002 figures, but showing
that the number of juvenile offenders who committed homicide, as a percentage of juveniles admitted to state
prison, remained at seven percent).
123. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 121, at 238.
124. This Comment excludes these juvenile offenders because it focuses on nonhomicide offenses that
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Of the 1,414 juvenile offenders remaining, it is safe to assume that only a
125
small percentage of them received a de facto LWOP sentence —a multi-decade
long sentence that exceeds their natural life span. Indeed, from 1985 to 1997, the
average maximum sentence for a juvenile offender who committed a violent
126
crime was only eight and one-half years. In addition, there are only a few
circumstances in which juvenile offenders can receive a de facto LWOP
127
sentence. In California, for example, a juvenile offender can only receive a de
facto LWOP sentence if he or she commits: (1) “crimes against multiple victims
during separate incidents,” or (2) “certain enumerated offenses, discharge[s] a
128
gun, and inflict[s] great bodily injury upon at least two victims.”
Assuming conservatively that five-percent of these 1,414 individuals
received a de facto LWOP sentence, seventy-one juveniles remain. The majority
of these seventy-one individuals probably received their sentences in the five
states with the largest concentration of juveniles serving life sentences:
129
California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Nevada.
Thus, because only an estimated seventy-one juveniles are serving de facto
LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses nationwide, and because it is likely
130
that many of these individuals are serving these sentences in only five states,
131
courts should find that states rarely impose these types of sentences. Because
states rarely impose these sentences, and because the Supreme Court has stated
132
that a national consensus exists when states rarely use a sentencing practice,
courts should find that a national consensus against sentencing juveniles to de
facto LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses exists.

might incur de facto LWOP sentences. See, e.g., California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct. App. 2d Dist.
2010) (reversing a de facto LWOP sentence for carjacking); California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 627
(Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (invalidating a 175-year-long sentence for a juvenile who committed aggravated
kidnapping); California v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a de
facto LWOP sentence for various sex offenses). Given that most of these cases involved serious crimes against
people, it seems unlikely that drug offenders or public order offenders would receive a de facto LWOP
sentence. See, e.g., id.; Nunez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 627; J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 144.
125. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 121, at 17 (discussing the rarity in sentencing trends).
126. STROM, supra note 3, at 1.
127. See infra text accompanying note 128 (discussing California as an example).
128. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 926 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011). California’s numbers
are important because the state houses the largest number of juveniles serving life sentences. NELLIS & KING,
supra note 121, at 17–18.
129. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 121, at 16 (ordering these five states by largest juvenile life
offender population). For comparison, the juvenile offenders who served actual LWOP sentences for
nonhomicide offenses were concentrated in only three states, with the majority in Florida. PAOLO G. ANNINO ET
AL., FL. ST. UNIV., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONHOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO
NATION 15 (2009).
130. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 121, at 17 (listing California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and
Nevada).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102 (discussing the statistics behind this conclusion).
132. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).
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2. Exercising Independent Judgment, Part I: Juvenile Offenders as a Whole
Lack the Culpability to Receive a de Facto LWOP Sentence
After determining a national consensus exists, a court would use its
133
independent judgment to determine whether a categorical rule is appropriate.
While making this independent judgment, a court can look to the culpability of
134
the offender in question. In the context of this Comment, a court would look to
135
the culpability of juvenile criminal offenders as a class. The Supreme Court, in
Roper v. Simmons, established that juveniles, when compared to adults, generally
are immature, lack a strong sense of responsibility and fully formed characters,
136
and are vulnerable to peer pressure. Thus, a juvenile defendant is not as
137
culpable as an adult who commits the same offense. Indeed, advances in
neuroscience and psychology reveal that a juvenile’s brain is less developed than
138
an adult’s. Overall, juvenile transgressions are “not as morally reprehensible as
139
[those] of an adult.”
The Supreme Court in Graham recognized that “[l]ife without parole is an
especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile
offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in
140
prison than an adult offender.” The Court explained that actual LWOP
sentences are inappropriate for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses
because, “when compared to an adult murderer, [juvenile offenders] who did not
141
kill or intend to kill [have] a twice diminished moral culpability.” Likewise, de
facto LWOP sentences are just as severe as actual LWOP sentences because in
142
both situations the offender will die in prison. But it is arguable that juveniles
whose sentences allow for the possibility of parole (even if they may never
receive it in their lifetimes) are even less morally culpable than people who
143
receive actual LWOP sentences. Given the severity of a de facto LWOP
133. Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 541 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). In theory, the Court could still
determine that a punishment is cruel and unusual even without a national consensus. See id. at 2026 (noting that
the Court will give strong deference to community consensus, but that consensus “is not itself determinative” of
whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred).
134. Id. at 2022.
135. Id. at 2026.
136. Id.; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
137. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27.
138. Id. at 2026. See generally Natalie Pifer, Is Life the Same as Death?: Implications of Graham v.
Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally
Retarded Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495 (2010) (describing the scientific advances).
139. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)) (internal
quotations omitted).
140. Id. at 2028.
141. Id. at 2027.
142. See California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 925 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (noting that a de
facto LWOP sentence is the functional equivalent of an actual LWOP sentence).
143. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, California v. Caballero, 250 P.3d 179 (2011) (No. B 217709), 2011
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sentence, and that juvenile offenders (especially those who committed
nonhomicide crimes) are less morally culpable than those who receive an actual
LWOP sentence, courts in their independent judgment should establish a
categorical ban on de facto LWOP sentences.
3. Exercising Independent Judgment, Part II: De Facto LWOP Sentences
for Juveniles Do Not Further Legitimate Penological Goals
Courts should also look to whether a particular sentence furthers legitimate
144
penological goals when deciding if a categorical ban is appropriate. In Graham,
the Supreme Court determined that LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders did not further traditional penological goals of retribution,
145
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. This section explains why de
146
facto LWOP sentences do not further any of these goals.
147
First, de facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of retribution. The
Supreme Court described this punishment theory as a way for society to restore
148
“the moral imbalance caused by the offense.” Simply, retribution means that “a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the
149
criminal offender.” In Graham, Justice Kennedy described how LWOP
sentences imposed on juveniles who committed nonhomicide crimes do not
150
reflect the lessened culpability of juveniles in general. The Court explained that
“retribution does not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less
151
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”
Likewise, de facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of retribution
because they are the functional equivalent of “the second most severe penalty” in

WL 2357944 at *17 (“Under Graham, however, minors who did not commit homicide, but cannot be paroled,
are entitled to release because they have twice-diminished moral responsibility. . . . It therefore follows that
juveniles who are sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are less culpable still.” (internal citation
omitted)).
144. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
145. Id. at 2028–29. States are free to choose which goal they want their penal system to represent. Id. at
2028. California, for example, has chosen retribution. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp.
2013).
146. Justice Werdegar’s concurring opinion in the California Supreme Court’s Caballero decision also
discusses these points, albeit briefly. California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 297–98 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, J.,
concurring).
147. See infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text (explaining how de facto LWOP sentences do not
effectively punish an offender for punishment’s sake).
148. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
149. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted).
150. Id. See generally supra Part III.B.2 (discussing how juveniles are less culpable than adults in
general).
151. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. See generally Pifer, supra note 138 (describing juvenile psychology
and differences with adults).
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the American justice system. Moreover, when states imprison juveniles based
on principles of retribution, they often overlook the offenders’ personal
153
background. But a juvenile offender’s background might explain why he or she
154
turned to crime in the first place. He or she might come from a broken home,
155
suffer from mental illness, or commit crime due to other personal tragedies that
156
shaped his or her outlook on life. Thus, because de facto LWOP sentences tend
to ignore a juvenile offender’s personal history, they do not further the goal of
157
retribution, which aims to reflect the defendant’s culpability.
In addition, de facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of
158
rehabilitation. While “the concept of rehabilitation is imprecise,” it involves, at
159
some level, a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” A de facto LWOP
sentence keeps juvenile offenders effectively imprisoned for life and thus
160
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” Moreover, juvenile nonhomicide
offenders, as a class, have a “capacity for change,” but cannot take advantage of
any positive changes in their personality or moral character because “the State
161
[made] an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society.”
A de facto LWOP sentence, like an actual LWOP sentence, “is an especially
harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence, a juvenile offender will on
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an
162
adult offender.” De facto LWOP sentences—which offer the possibility of
parole in name only—deny the juvenile offender any hope for personal
163
improvement. Indeed, these sentences deprive “the convict of the most basic

152. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028; see also California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Ct. App. 2d
Dist. 2010) (describing the defendant’s de facto LWOP sentence as “materially indistinguishable” from an
actual LWOP sentence).
153. Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must
Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 20 (2011).
154. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–20 (discussing how Graham’s parents “were addicted to crack
cocaine [and that Graham] began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age nine and smoked marijuana at age
thirteen.”).
155. See California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 921 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (noting that
Caballero suffered from schizophrenia at the time of his crimes).
156. See California v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141, 146 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (noting how the
defendant, who sexually abused his victims, was himself sexually abused).
157. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, California v. Caballero, 250 P.3d 179 (2011) (No. B 217709), 2011
WL 2357944, at *17 (“Under Graham, however, minors who did not commit homicide, but cannot be paroled,
are entitled to release because they have twice-diminished moral responsibility. . . . It therefore follows that
juveniles who are sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are less culpable still.”).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 159–165 (discussing how a de facto LWOP sentence is the
farthest thing from rehabilitation).
159. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 2030. See generally Green, supra note 153, at 1 (arguing that the states
must reform or implement rehabilitative programs to comply with Graham).
160. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2028.
163. Id. at 2027.
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liberties without giving hope of restoration.” Because de facto LWOP
sentences do not offer any meaningful opportunity for release, they do not further
165
the goal of rehabilitation.
166
De facto LWOP sentences also do not further the goal of deterrence.
According to the deterrence theory of punishment, criminal sentences “may serve
167
to prevent future crime.” But the Graham Court suggested that juveniles, as a
168
class, “will be less susceptible to deterrence” because they tend to lack maturity
and a sense of responsibility, and may engage in “impetuous and ill-considered
169
actions and decisions.” Indeed, de facto LWOP sentences do not appear to
deter juvenile crime because courts tend to impose the sentence only on juveniles
170
who commit a series of crimes. Moreover, Justice Kennedy observed that
actual LWOP sentences probably did not deter juvenile offenders from
171
committing crimes because states rarely imposed the sentence. Likewise,
172
judges impose de facto LWOP sentences only in rare circumstances. Because
de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles do not prevent these offenders from
committing multiple crimes and because states rarely impose the sentence, de
173
facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of deterrence.
Finally, the goal of incapacitation does not justify de facto LWOP sentences.
The incapacitation theory of punishment suggests that a state should imprison
174
some criminals so that those individuals do not commit more crimes.
Admittedly, supporters of de facto LWOP sentences would point to this goal to
175
justify punishing juvenile offenders.
They would explain that juvenile

164. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 159–165 (explaining how a de facto LWOP sentences fail to
serve a rehabilitative purpose).
166. See infra text accompanying notes 170–172 (discussing how de facto LWOP sentences will not
prevent future crimes).
167. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 843, 853 (2002).
168. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)) (internal
quotations omitted).
169. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotations omitted).
170. See, e.g., California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 926 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (noting how
California only imposes de facto LWOP sentences on offenders who commit multiple crimes or injure multiple
victims); California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 624 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (explaining that multiple
victims or crimes often “underlie” de facto LWOP sentences).
171. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29.
172. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing how courts only impose de facto LWOP sentences on rare
occasions).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 168–172 (discussing how de fact LWOP sentences do not serve
the deterrence theory of punishment).
174. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (discussing the limits of incapacitation theory as an explanation for
LWOP sentences).
175. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2490 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment
does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from committing
additional crimes in the outside world.”).
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offenders like Rodrigo Caballero—who the state charged with three counts of
attempted murder—should remain in prison because they committed serious
176
crimes. But the Supreme Court repeatedly explains in Graham that juveniles
177
are less culpable than adult offenders, especially in the nonhomicide context.
While the Court is aware that juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes should
receive some punishment, it has strong words for those who believe such
offenders should be locked up for life:
To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles
make that judgment questionable. . . . As one court concluded in a
challenge to a life without parole sentence for a 14-year-old,
178
“incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”
Although certain juvenile offenders do commit serious nonhomicide crimes,
de facto LWOP sentences carry the same effect as actual LWOP sentences—the
juvenile offender will never again step foot outside of prison. While
incapacitation may be a worthy goal in some contexts, de facto LWOP sentences
179
deny “the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”
Moreover, if a state imposes de facto LWOP sentences for incapacitation
purposes on nonhomicide juvenile offenders, it will violate Graham’s central
premise that juvenile nonhomicide offenders must receive a meaningful
180
opportunity for release. Thus, incapacitation does not justify de facto LWOP
181
sentences. Because de facto LWOP sentences do not further any legitimate
penological goals, courts should adopt a categorical rule banning these sentences
for juvenile offenders.
4. Dissenting Voices: Responding to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
The previous three subsections explained why courts should adopt a
categorical rule banning de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders. But supporters of de facto LWOP sentences have some allies on the

176. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 921 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011); see also Graham, 130
S. Ct. at 2029 (noting that “[r]ecidivism is a serious risk to public safety. . . .”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2041
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (discussing specific instances of juvenile cruelty).
177. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Court’s analysis of juvenile culpability).
178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (quoting Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App.
1968)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2030.
181. See also infra Part III.B.4 (addressing arguments by Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts that
suggest juveniles who committed terrible crimes are irredeemable).
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183

Justice Alito’s dissent
and Chief Justice Roberts’
Supreme Court.
184
185
concurrence in Graham provide arguments for de facto LWOP supporters.
Justice Alito’s dissent flatly rejects the idea of banning de facto LWOP
186
sentences. “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence
187
to a term of years without the possibility of parole,” he writes. Indeed,
Graham’s attorney conceded that a sentence of forty years without parole would
188
probably not violate the Eighth Amendment. But a juvenile who received a
forty-year sentence at age seventeen would be eligible for parole at age fiftyseven, and thus might be released before his or her life expectancy. A true de
facto LWOP sentence deprives the juvenile offender of all hope because there is
no meaningful possibility of release. Rodrigo Caballero, for example, was
189
sentenced to 110 years in prison. Victor Mendez received an eighty-four year
190
sentence. In light of such sentences, and the fact that states must give juvenile
nonhomicide offenders a meaningful opportunity for release, it is difficult to
justify Justice Alito’s reasoning.
191
In contrast to Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts offers a compromise. He
argues that Graham’s sentence was cruel and unusual under the grossly
192
disproportionate test, but a categorical rule banning actual LWOP sentences in
193
this context is unnecessary. The Chief Justice argues that courts require
flexibility when sentencing defendants, and points to cases where juveniles
194
committed horrific nonhomicide crimes.
A ban against de facto LWOP sentences would indeed allow juvenile
offenders who commit heinous nonhomicide crimes to possibly obtain release
before the end of natural life expectancy. But the majority opinion in Graham
anticipated these problems: “A state is not required to guarantee eventual
195
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.” Moreover,
those “who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be
182. See infra text accompanying notes 186–194 (discussing the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito).
183. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2036–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
185. But see California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 297 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, J., concurring)
(“Characterization by the Graham dissenters of the scope of the majority opinion is, of course, dubious authority
. . . .”).
186. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 920–21 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011).
190. California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 870 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010).
191. See infra text accompanying notes 192–194 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning).
192. See supra Part II.A (discussing the “grossly disproportionate” framework).
193. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
194. See id. at 2041 (“But what about Milagro Cunningham, a 17-year-old who beat and raped an 8year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock in a recycling bin in a remote landfill?”).
195. Id. at 2030 (majority opinion).

981

_05_FREEMAN_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:41 AM

2013 / The Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences
irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.
The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted
of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for
196
life.”
Indeed, if states ban de facto LWOP sentences, they must provide juvenile
197
offenders a meaningful opportunity for release. This language means that states
should give all nonhomicide juvenile offenders a chance to grow and prove that
198
they deserve to reenter civilized society. But juvenile offenders must also
accept personal responsibility for their actions and work hard for redemption; the
199
state is not obligated to hand them a get-out-of-prison-free card.
C. The General Principle Test

200

Instead of creating a separate categorical rule, courts could alternatively rely
on Graham’s general principle, that juvenile nonhomicide offenders must receive
201
a meaningful opportunity for release, and strike down sentences on a case-by202
case basis. The court in California v. Mendez did just that. From a conceptual
standpoint, this test is simple to administer—a court would examine a juvenile
nonhomicide offender’s life expectancy and compare it with the length of the
sentence. The court could take into consideration the offender’s life
203
204
experiences and the nature of the crime. If the sentence exceeds the
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 2032 (“Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for
remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79 (explaining the state’s obligation to give juvenile
offenders a mere opportunity for release, not a guarantee). Even if a juvenile offender receives this opportunity
for release, he might not necessarily receive parole, especially if the state has expressed concern for crime
victims. Thus, those juvenile offenders who commit heinous nonhomicide crimes and show no sign of
rehabilitation are less likely to walk free. The key is that the state gave them an opportunity to change. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (providing a comprehensive list of rights to crime victims including the right to appear
at parole proceedings).
200. See California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882–83 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (discussing the
application of Graham’s general principles).
201. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (“Although
proper authorities may later determine that youths should remain incarcerated for their natural lives, the state
may not deprive them at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness
to reenter society in the future.”).
202. 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882–83 (discussing the application of Graham’s general principles). The
California Supreme Court did not apply the general principle test when it struck down de facto LWOP
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, but instead extended Graham to include these sentences. See
California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (2012) (“Miller therefore made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on
life without parole sentences applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile offenders, including the termof-years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence imposed in this
case.”).
203. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018 (discussing the defendant’s personal history).
204. See supra note 189 (discussing certain instances of juvenile cruelty).
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offender’s life expectancy, the court can choose to strike it down. The general
principle test would give courts flexibility and allow sentencing judges to punish
206
juveniles who commit particularly heinous nonhomicide offenses. However,
like the grossly disproportionate test, this general principle test would apply on a
case-by-case basis, and thus some juvenile offenders would inevitably receive
207
unjust de facto LWOP sentences. While the general principle test has some
benefits, a categorical rule is superior because it prevents judges from imposing
these sentences in the first place, protects all juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and
208
encourages states to reform their juvenile justice systems.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
This Part discusses the consequences of imposing a categorical ban on de
facto LWOP sentences for juveniles. Section A examines whether a categorical
rule will actually help juvenile offenders or whether judges will merely grant
lengthy but barely constitutional sentences. Section B examines policy
implications of such a rule, including whether states need to rethink their
sentencing practices.
A. A Chance for Hope or No Hope at All?
If states ban de facto LWOP sentences, they will have to develop new
sentencing regimes that address juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide
crimes. One obstacle to implementing such a system is that sentencing law is
notoriously complicated and legislatures tend to grant sentencing judges a
209
healthy amount of discretion. Unfortunately, this means that some prosecutors
and judges might pursue sentences that are just short of an unconstitutional de
210
facto LWOP sentence. If the average life expectancy of a typical American
205. In theory, prosecutors might ask for a sentence that falls just short of a defendant’s life expectancy
so they could argue it does not run afoul of Graham’s general principles. See Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882–
83 (discussing the application of Graham’s general principles). Courts that apply this test should be wary of
arguments that attempt to elevate form over substance.
206. See supra note 194 (describing an instance of a nonhomicide offense).
207. See generally Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 (applying the general principle test as applied to
Mendez’s sentence only).
208. See infra Part IV.A (discussing possible reforms).
209. See, e.g., Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 n.8 (discussing in detail how Mendez’s eighty-four-year
sentence was calculated). Another obstacle is that juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are already serving de
facto LWOP sentences will have to navigate the labyrinth of habeas corpus proceedings in order to obtain
release, which is no easy task. See generally, Theresa Hsu Schriever, Comment, In Our Own Backyard: Why
California Should Care About Habeas Corpus, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. __ (forthcoming) (discussing at length
the serious obstacles prisoners face when attempting to overturn wrongfully imposed sentences).
210. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of
Years?, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 367–68 (2011) (describing at least one case in which a judge sentenced a minor to
a ninety-year sentence, but the judge’s reasoning constituted a “transparent disregard for the Graham
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male is seventy-six years, it is plausible that some courts might sentence
juvenile offenders to a term of years that falls just short, and thus avoid
constitutional scrutiny.
In Florida, for example, juveniles have received little relief despite
212
Graham. Although the Court prohibited juveniles from serving actual LWOP
sentences, Florida courts circumvented the Court’s holding by sentencing
juveniles who committed nonhomicide crimes to de facto LWOP sentences
213
instead. For example, a thirteen-year-old juvenile offender—who may have
received an actual LWOP sentence before Graham—received a sixty-five-year
214
de facto LWOP sentence after committing “a series of robberies and rapes.”
Thus, the Florida courts continue denying juvenile offenders a meaningful
215
opportunity for release, which is contrary to Graham’s rationale. Courts that
seek to follow the Supreme Court’s holding—that states must provide a
meaningful opportunity for release—should be careful not to elevate form over
substance.
Assuming courts implement categorical bans against de facto LWOP
sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses, state legislatures may
need to confront a vexing question—how exactly does one provide a meaningful
opportunity for release? As Justice Kennedy admits, categorical rules “tend to be
216
imperfect.” But state legislatures can make up for the inherent deficiencies in
categorical rules—and avoid unjust sentencing practices—by developing specific
sentencing schemes that address juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide
217
crimes. There are a few solutions for legislatures, though no solution is perfect.
First, a legislature could adopt conditional release statutes that allow certain
individuals—typically those who have reached the age of sixty-five and have
218
already served at least ten years of their sentence—to petition for release.
While these broad statutes would allow juvenile offenders to seek relief from
decision.”).
211. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 213–15 (discussing Florida’s use of de facto LWOP sentences).
213. Lloyd Dunkelberger, Juvenile Offenders Still Get Near-Life Terms, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE,
Nov. 21, 2010, at A1.
214. Id.
215. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (requiring states provide juvenile offenders a
meaningful opportunity for release). Could some of these sentences be the result of bad lawyering? Some
advocates argue courts should allow juveniles to challenge their sentences based on ineffective assistance of
counsel claims if their attorney failed to offer mitigating evidence. Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy:
Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391 (2012).
216. Id.
217. See California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 n.5 (Cal. 2012) (“We urge the California State
Legislature to enact legislation establishing a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a defendant serving a
de facto life sentence without possibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes that he or she committed as a
juvenile with the opportunity to obtain release on a showing of rehabilitation and maturity.”).
218. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-139 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2009) (allowing
certain offenders to petition for conditional release).
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lengthy sentences, a juvenile might still spend several decades in prison, while an
adult offender could take advantage of the statute sooner. A legislature could also
cap the number of years that juvenile offenders can serve in prison, for example
at twenty-five years. While this method would allow juveniles an earlier
opportunity to petition for release, it would also prevent judges from awarding
harsher sentences to juveniles who commit nonhomicide, but nonetheless
219
horrific, offenses. Finally, a legislature could pass a statute that allows courts to
consider whether the juvenile offender has demonstrated a desire to reform after
the offense was committed; such factors could include participation in
220
educational, vocational, or counseling programs. Regardless of what method a
state chooses, it must always keep in mind that it must offer juvenile offenders a
221
meaningful opportunity for release.
B. Additional Policy Implications
In addition to the statutory solutions mentioned above, states might want to
experiment with a more radical option—reducing the number of juveniles
222
charged as adults. Instead of sending these juvenile offenders through the court
system, states could implement rehabilitative programs, or reform their existing
juvenile justice systems to meet the needs of juvenile offenders who might
223
reoffend if they were released. As one juvenile justice advocate argues, “[t]he
States must give credence to the Court’s conclusions by providing juveniles with
sufficient opportunity for personal development. Otherwise, the opportunity for
personal growth will effectively become a non-opportunity as incarcerated
juveniles learn to become seasoned criminals while subjected to the highly
224
criminogenic adult prison culture.”
219. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (discussing specific instances where
juvenile offenders committed serious nonhomicide offenses).
220. Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should do to Provide a Meaningful Opportunity for
Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV., 310, 346–48 (2012).
221. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 at 2030 (majority opinion).
222. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 47 (2011), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/cjsc/publications/misc/jj11/preface.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that in 2011, California probation departments reported 912 transfers to the adult system).
223. See generally Green, supra note 153 (discussing various ways that rehabilitative principles conform
with Graham’s holding).
224. Id. at 12. In addition to introducing rehabilitative programs, a state may also have to reform its
parole system to give juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity for release. See Michelle Marquis, Graham v.
Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for Both Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
255, 282–87 (2011) (discussing how compliance with Graham will also implicate changes to state parole
boards). In California, for example, the State’s Realignment plan may offer an opportunity to implement such
changes. See generally Andrew M. Ducart, Comment, Go Directly to Jail: How Misaligned Subsidies
Undermine California's Prisoner Realignment Goals and What Is Possible to Maximize the Law's Potential, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 481 (2013); Steven Thomas Fazzi, Comment, A Primer on the 2011 Corrections
Realignment: Why California Placed Felons Under County Control, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 423 (2013)
(analyzing the implementation of California’s Realignment plan).
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Unfortunately, introducing rehabilitative elements into existing state criminal
justice systems is easier in theory than in practice. For example, “adult court
sentencing practices are largely based upon punitive considerations,” which is
225
often a disadvantage to juvenile offenders. For instance, when the California
Second District Court of Appeal sentenced Victor Mendez, who had committed
his crimes at age sixteen, to eighty-four years in prison, it did not take into
226
account “Mendez’s personal and family life and upbringing.” Indeed, when a
Florida court sentenced Terrance Graham, the sentencing judge focused more on
his repeat offender status than the fact that Graham’s parents “were addicted to
crack cocaine [and that] Graham began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age
227
nine and smoked marijuana at age thirteen.”
Moreover, even if a state does offer rehabilitative programs, those programs
may fall victim to budget cuts. For example, at one point California threatened
budget cuts to the state’s Department of Juvenile Justice, which would further
228
strain an already burdened system. “Under the budget reduction enacted [in
December 2011], the agency will cease to exist unless counties pony up $125,000
229
a year per youth offender.” In a situation like this, the worst-case scenario is
that prosecutors may start charging juvenile offenders as adults instead of
sending them to the endangered department, which might expose these juvenile
230
offenders to unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentences. Although the cuts were
231
later rescinded, difficult fiscal times might threaten juvenile justice institutions
again. States determining whether to cut their juvenile justice agencies will have
to weigh the long-term goals of reforming juvenile offenders against any shortterm fiscal gains.
V. CONCLUSION
Graham v. Florida offers hope for juvenile justice advocates. The Court’s
decision to create a categorical rule outside the context of the death penalty—and
directly aimed at juveniles—suggests that it will start taking a hard look at how

225. Green, supra note 153, at 20.
226. California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 884 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010).
227. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–20 (quoting the sentencing judge as saying, “And I don’t
understand why you would be given such a great opportunity to do something with your life and why you
would throw it away.”).
228. Marisa Lagos, Juvenile Offenders: Cuts Put Counties on the Spot, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26, 2011, at
A1.
229. Id.
230. See id. (noting that some opponents of the budget cuts warn that “[i]f prosecutors do not believe
there is a safe, affordable place to house juvenile criminals, they may be more likely to charge more of them as
adults, and subject them to state prison.”).
231. Rina Palta, Brown Backs Off Plan to Shut Down Youth Prisons, 89.3 KPCC (May 16, 2012),
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/news/2012/05/16/6146/division-juvenile-justice/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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states punish young offenders. But because the lower courts have largely resisted
extending Graham’s general principles, most juvenile offenders serving de facto
LWOP sentences for nonhomicide crimes have had little success challenging
232
their sentences. While the California Supreme Court’s Caballero decision is a
victory for juvenile justice advocates, it is unclear whether other courts will
233
construe Graham to include de facto LWOP sentences.
The solution is for the courts to adopt a categorical rule inspired by, but
234
completely separate from, Graham. A categorical rule will force state
legislatures to develop new statutory schemes that will address the deficiencies of
the current systems. These statutory schemes may involve conditional-release
programs, a maximum sentence for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders, or
235
perhaps a greater focus on rehabilitation. Such arrangements would also allow
states to comply with the Court’s command that juvenile offenders receive a
meaningful opportunity for release. Advocates for a categorical rule should
expect a tough fight, especially given the lower courts’ reluctance to extend
236
Graham in general. However, this Comment provides an initial framework for
advocates because an examination of government data suggests that states rarely
impose de facto LWOP sentences on juveniles who commit nonhomicide
237
offenses.
The actions of the United States and California Supreme Courts should
inspire further conversation about how juveniles are punished and rehabilitated.
This conversation is worth having because the status quo is untenable.
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court appears to recognize this problem.
Advocates should be encouraged that the Court has expressly considered the
mindset of the typical juvenile offender in Roper and Graham; and in both cases,
the juvenile offender’s relative lack of mental development and maturity
238
convinced the Court to alter longstanding sentencing practices. In a sign of how
far the Court has come, the Miller v. Alabama Court altered longstanding
sentencing practices, even though the juvenile offenders were convicted of

232. Hechinger, supra note 15, at 425 n.91.
233. Admittedly, California’s approach avoids the difficulty in determining the existence of a national
consensus. But as Justice Werdegar notes, “we are extending the high court’s jurisprudence to a situation that
court has not had occasion to address.” California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 296 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, J.,
concurring). Indeed if courts analyze de facto LWOP sentences under the traditional Eighth Amendment
framework as opposed to extending Graham, then they will still have to find evidence of a national consensus.
See supra Part II.A (discussing this framework).
234. See supra Part III.B (discussing the framework for a categorical ban).
235. See supra Part IV.A (discussing potential solutions for state legislatures if confronted with a new
categorical ban on these sentences).
236. See Hechinger, supra note 15, at 425 n.91 (noting that most defendants who rely on Graham to
challenge de facto LWOP sentences are unsuccessful).
237. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the statistical evidence suggesting a national consensus exists).
238. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing why juvenile offenders who are sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole are less culpable than those sentenced to LWOP).
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239

homicide. When the Court next hears an Eighth Amendment case involving
juveniles, it will likely consider the offender’s personal background and
240
hardships. The fact that the Court has taken a strong interest in juvenile
offender cases suggests now is a perfect time to challenge de facto LWOP
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. As the California Supreme Court
showed in California v. Caballero, this is a fight that can be won.

239. See 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that the Eight Amendment bars mandatory LWOP sentence for
juveniles convicted of homicide).
240. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010) (describing Terrance Graham’s difficult
upbringing in the second paragraph of the case); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (noting that one of the juvenile
offenders had a tragic family history: “Both his mother and his grandmother had previously shot other
individuals.”).
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